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Fair Kidney Allocation Based on Waiting Time 
Abstract: We study the allocation of cadaveric donor kidneys for transplantation based 
merely on waiting time. This simple allocation rule turns out to possess very attrac-
tive ethical and medical properties. Current allocation rules, on the other hand, violate 
some basic requirements of distributive justice. Perhaps for fear of exacerbating these 
problems, these rules also fail to consider criteria such as sex, age and race although 
certain combinations of these criteria are known to affect graft survival rates. We 
demonstrate that allocation by waiting time automatically protects disadvantaged pa-
tient types and puts them in a near to optimal position. The inclusion of sex, age and 
race will therefore not Iead to morally unacceptable allocations. This allows individual 
patients to improve the expected survival time of their graft relative to the status quo 
without being penalized by the allocation rule. Moreover, decisions ab out when to 
start compromising on expected graft survival rates in favour of shorter waiting times 
are made locally by patients and their medical advisers rather than by a centralized 
protocol. 
1. Introduction 
We propose to allocate cadaveric donor kidneys primarily on the basis of recip-
ients' waiting time. When a new donor organ becomes available, the patient 
with the Iongest waiting time is first offered this organ for transplantation. If 
the patient and her medical advisers reject the organ, it is offered to the next 
patient on the waiting list who can again accept the organ or pass it on to the 
next patient etc. Refusal to accept an organ does not alter patients' position 
on the waiting list. We provide an explicit protocol for this process. We retain 
some control over the patients' range of choices to exclude medically impossible 
allocations (e.g., incompatible blood types) and to guarantee that the patient 
is in a fit state to undergo transplantation. Waiting time is measured from the 
start of dialysis and ties in waiting time are broken randomly.1 Some modifi-
cations will be made to accommodate the special needs of children or patients 
with high medical urgency. These patient groups are already recognized by the 
current allocation rules to be significantly different from other patients and to 
deserve special considerations. Criteria that equalize regional or international 
export/import balances can also be added if we wish. 
Allocation by waiting time (AWT) is a simple, decentralized and transparent 
mechanism that is responsive to the patients' and their medical advisers' judge-
• I wish to thank Bill for his thoughtful comments. 
1 We could also consider measuring waiting time from the time of the patient's enlistment. 
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ment about how to balance waiting time against other (medical) criteria. We 
show that A WT removes the tension that is present in current allocation rules 
between optimal medical predictors of graft survival and concerns of distributive 
justice. We shall show that A WT automatically protects disadvantaged patient 
types. For example, it leads to an automatic protection of patients with blood 
type 0. Moreover, it allows patients to improve the expected survival time of 
their graft relative to the status quo without being penalized by the allocation 
system. These optimality properties are established by a simple statistical argu-
ment: Patients of a rare medical type, for example, wait on average Ionger before 
an organ of their rare type becomes available. This increased waiting time gives 
rare patients automatically a higher priority under AWT. Hence, the probability 
is very small that an organ of a rare type will be allocated to a patient of a more 
common type. 
The allocation methods currently used in Europe and N orth America already 
give a significant weight to a patient's waiting time. Wujciak/Opelz (1993) made 
an impressive argument for using waiting time as a criterion in addition to HLA 
matches and PRA sensitization (measures of antigen and antibody compatibil-
ity). In the current allocation rules of Eurotransplant and the American United 
Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), HLA matehing is traded off against long 
waiting times so that patients of rare medical types can become eligible for an 
organ with a compromised HLA match. For short waiting times, patients of rare 
medical types are at a clear disadvantage because they are unlikely to find an 
organ with a good HLA match. This disadvantage is only partly offset by the 
inclusion of 'matchbility' (the probability of finding a better match in the fu-
ture) as a criterion. Rare patient types are forced to compete for argans mainly 
through prolonged waiting times. They arenot given the opportunity to deter-
mine their own trade-off between additional waiting time and a compromised 
HLA match. In North America, this leads to imbalances in the racial compo-
sition of the recipients. Moreover, morally sensitive patient attributes such as 
sex, age and race are not systematically taken into account by the current al-
location practice although some of their combinations appear to be correlated 
with graft survival rates (Persijn/Smits/De Meester 1999). If these criteria were 
taken into account, additional imbalances would arise. In Europe, for instance, 
the 'old-for-old' programme in which kidneys from older donors are allocated to 
older recipients meets with some resistance on the part of older patients. Such 
ethical problems can only be expected to intensify as non-immunological factors 
continue to emerge as predictors of graft survival rates. 
It is clear that any allocation method must make certain trade-offs between 
medical criteria, waiting time and other special attributes ofthe patients. AWT 
determines these trade-offs locally through the decisions of patients and their 
medical advisers. Currently used allocation methods specify such trade-offs in a 
quantitative manner through a centralized allocation protocol. Patients collect a 
certain number of points, for instance, for medical criteria (HLA matching, PRA 
sensitization, matchability) and for waiting time. The relative number of points 
awarded refl.ects the trade-offs that are implicit in the allocation method. This 
point system has to be adjusted frequently to respond to medical innovation and 
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unfulfilled concerns for distributive justice. In economic theory it is well-known 
that such trade-offs are notoriously difficult, if not impossible, to make for a 
central decision maker like Eurotransplant or UNOS. More importantly, there 
is no sound medical or moral basis for making these trade-offs on behalf of the 
patients. Patients differ strongly in their psychological, social and emotional 
condition. They may even differ in their rational evaluation of the risks and the 
benefits of dialysis and transplantation. 
U nder the current system, patients are in a very poor position to choose 
their own trade-offs. Firstly, the system structurally penalizes selective patients 
who want to achieve better medical matches than chosen by the central allo-
cation protocol. For instance, patients who bypass an offer because they want 
to match the donor organ for sex or age are not guaranteed to be offered the 
next available organ. Instead, they will have to compete for the next organ 
with patients who will have newly joined the waiting Iist and who may have a 
better medical compatibility with the next organ. In other words, if a selective 
patient turns down an organ, then a weaker competitor receives the organ and 
is removed from the waiting Iist while new and stronger competitors may still 
join the waiting Iist. A selective patient's ability to choose is therefore not pre-
served from round to round. Secondly, patients cannot achieve shorter waiting 
times than chosen by the central allocation protocol even if they are prepared 
to accept marginal organs. To use a technical term from welfare theory, the 
current allocation system is not Pareto optimal or efficient ( cf. below). Thirdly, 
there is no explicit protocol to accommodate the patients' choices in the alloca-
tion process. Fourthly, patients Iack relevant medical information. A project is 
currently under way to design a decision support system that conveys medically 
relevant information to the patient and their medical advisers in a cognitively 
and psychologically tractable format. When joining the waiting Iist, we envisage 
the patients and their medical advisers to draw up a plan that specifies at what 
time they wish to accept an organ with specific characteristics. For instance, 
a patient may decide to accept a 'marginal' organ (an organ of poor quality) 
in retum for a short waiting time but not after a long waiting time. Patients 
have the opportunity to revise this plan on a regular basis. Patients can also 
choose from a set of default plans or recommendations by the central allocation 
authority. Patients may prefer to delegate the choice of such a plan to their 
medical advisers. Transplant surgeons will always play an important role in this 
process because of unquantifiable characteristics of donor organs that require a 
surgeon's medical judgement. 
Although high graft survival ratesarenot the only relevant criterion by which 
to judge an allocation mechanism, they are certainly one very important crite-
rion. The average medical optimality of AWT depends on local decisions and 
local evaluations of acceptable trade-offs. Patients have adefinite incentive to 
maximize their graft survival rates, especially in view of medical side effects 
and complications arising from poor compatibility. Moreover, AWT allows the 
systematic inclusion of medical criteria such as age, sex and race that provide 
improved predictors of a graft's expected survival time. This may suggest that 
the medical performance of AWT will compare favourably with that of the cur-
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rent allocation rules because it taps into a potential for improvement. The exact 
performance of AWT can only be gauged once we have collected data on patients' 
trade-offs. 
2. Evaluation 
2.1 Optimal Compensation of Disadvantage 
AWT promotes equality of opportunity among patients. Equality of opportunity 
does not imply that all patients receive an organ with the same expected survival 
time after the same waiting period. The persistent shortage of suitable donor 
organs and the medical differences among patients make it impossible to achieve 
such equality of outcomes. Equality of opportunity implies, however, that the 
effect of any natural disadvantage is kept assmallas possible. AWT does indeed 
possess this optimality property. It ensures that patients of a disadvantaged 
medical type wait for a time that is close to the minimum possible waiting time. 
Any remaining imbalances are either the result of a natural disadvantage for 
which our current medical technology is unable to compensate or the result of 
the disadvantaged patient's personal choice. Since AWT automatically protects 
disadvantaged patients, special precautions taken on behalf of these patients 
are superfluous. We will examine these optimality properties from a statistical 
viewpoint. Any allocation rule has to operate in a stochastic environment in 
which donor organs and new patients appear in a random order and at random 
times and in which the survival time of a graft can only be predicted with a 
certain probability. No algorithm can avoid inequalities that are caused by such 
random variations in the supply and demand for organs andin the actual survival 
time of a graft. The best we can do is to compare alternative allocation rules on 
a statistical basis. 2 
Over and above providing equality of opportunity, AWT has additional, 
morally desirable properlies that concern the manner in which it allocates scarce 
resources among patients that are not distinguished by natural advantages or 
disadvantages. Firstly, AWT results in allocations in which we cannot make 
any individual better off without making some individual worse off.3 For obvi-
ous reasons, such allocations arealso called 'efficient' or Pareto optimal (named 
after the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto, 1848-1923). Since both the Euro-
transplant and the UNOS rule do not reflect patients' preferences, they threaten 
to produce allocations that could be improved without making any patient worse 
off. Secondly, A WT results in 'envy-free' allocations in which no patient would 
want to switch places with anybody else who joined the waiting list at roughly 
2 Hild (2001a; 2001b) provides theoretical reasons why such an ex ante evaluation is prefer-
able to an ex post analysis in terms of Quality Adjusted Life Years. 
3 We resolve a patient's indifference between accepting and rejecting an organ by passing 
the organ on to the next patient. We assume that if some patient is indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting an organ, there is some other patient with a shorter waiting time who 
prefers to accept the organ. This guarantees a Pareto optimal allocation of the chance to 
receive an organ depending on waiting time. 
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the sametime (Tinbergen 1953, Foley 1967, Thomson/Varian 1985). In other 
words, no patient i would prefer to receive an organ allocated to another patient 
j if i also had to accept the same expected waiting time for this organ as patient 
j did (assuming that ceteris paribus patients prefer shorter waiting times). In 
this sense, envy-free allocations provide a conflict-free and harmonious state of 
affairs. As a sorry implication of the current donation rates, this condition is 
only satisfied for patients who join the waiting list at roughly the same time. 
Since donor organs currently arrive at a slower rate than patients, the waiting list 
must be increasing in size and future patients will on average have to wait Ionger 
than current patients. If donation rates were one day to exceed kidney failure 
rates, the situation would conversely favour patients who are born later and join 
the waiting list at a later time. In the Eurotransplant and UNOS algorithms, 
waiting time gathers an increasing weight and will require repeated adjustments. 
We willlater consider a formula for compensating forthistemporal effect. 
2.2 Rare Medical Types 
It is easy to see why A WT puts disadvantaged patients in a near optimal position. 
As a first example, we focus on disadvantages that are linked to rare medical 
types. Without any loss of generality, we may suppose that we have patients 
and organs of two types, the first representing a common combination of medical 
characteristics and the second representing a rare combination. A WT guarantees 
that with high probability an organ of a rare medical type is not misallocated to 
a patient of a common medical type. The reason is simply that patients of a rare 
medical type on average wait Ionger until the next organ of their type becomes 
available. On average, this increases their waiting time and moves them closer 
to the front of the waiting list. The rare patient type is therefore automatically 
eligible for the next organ of the rare organ type. 
This intuitive analysis is borne out by a precise statistical treatment (cf. 
Appendix 187). The probability of misallocating an organ of a rare type to 
a patient of a common type quickly falls to zero as the number of allocated 
organs increases. If a rare type occurs with a frequency of 5% in the population 
of donors and recipients, the probability of a misallocation falls to 1% as we 
go through less than 200 allocations. Even in the European allocation system 
which has a smaller volume of allocations than its American Counterpart, 200 
organs become available in less than 4 weeks. Figure 1 charts this probability of 
a misallocation for different frequencies of the 'rare' type. The lower part of this 
figure shows a contour chart of this probability surface. For any frequency, the 
fallibility of AWT is reduced to below 1% after as few as 800 allocations. It is by 
no means necessary to assume that the frequency of the rare type be the same 
in the population of donors and in the population of recipients. Our precise 
calculations let us make predictions about situations where these frequencies 
differ. The probability of a misallocation is, of course, not the only relevant 
measure of optimality. Another measure of allocative efficiency is the average 
proportion of misallocated organs of the rare type. This measure is not plotted 
here but, displaying the same behaviour that we saw before, it quickly falls to 
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Figure 1: Probability of misallocation. 
(a = 1) 
zero as we go through a year's supply of donor organs. 4 
Matthias Hild 
800 
In the USA, the focus on medical criteria (HLA matching, PRA sensitization) 
disadvantages less frequent population groups, particularly African-Americans 
who wait significantly Ionger for kidney transplants than do Caucasian patients. 
Leffell/Zachary (1999) conclude that the 1995 policy change in the UNOS alloca-
tion rule did not remedy this problem. Although Caucasian patients constitute 
only 51.2% of the total US patient pool, they receive 78.5% of all organs that 
are allocated with 0 HLA mismatches and 54.4% of all other organs even after 
the 1995 revisions of the allocation rule. While African-Americans constitute 
30.6% of the total patient pool, they receive only 10.5% of all organs that are 
allocated with 0 HLA mismatches. This imbalance arises from the immuno-
logical characteristics of African-Americans and from the weight that is given 
to these characteristics. Racial imbalances are a troublesome development of a 
well-intentioned allocation rule which clearly shows that the authority to deter-
mine tradtH>ffs and to compromise on HLA matehing must be put back in the 
hands of the medically disadvantaged patients themselves. For a rare type with 
a frequency of 30% in the overall population, the probability of a misallocation 
falls to 1.5% after less than 300 allocations. 
Our calculations are strictly based on a worst--case scenario. We assume that 
patients of a rare type can onfy accept organs of the same type and that all 
patients of the common type accept any organ that is offered to them. This 
extreme assumption simulates a situation of extreme competition and of an ex-
4 We note that a rare patient type will for statistical reasons suffer from a greater variation 
in the duration of waiting times. It is outside of our power to compensate the rare patient 
type for this statistical disadvantage. 
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treme disadvantage of the rare type. Remarkably, AWT yields close to optimal 
results even in this extreme environment. Our second conservative assumption 
concerns the initial composition of the waiting list. Our calculations assume 
that the waiting list has no history and is randomly composed of rare and com-
mon types. In reality, we inherit a waiting list that already contains patients 
of the rare type at the front of the waiting list. This decreases the probabil-
ity of a misallocation even further. Our calculations also allow us to study an 
optimal initial configuration of the waiting list before we implement AWT. In 
other words, a fine-tuned implementation of AWT can decrease the probabil-
ity of a misallocation even further. As a singular measure, fine-tuning involves 
moving some disadvantaged patients further to the front of the waiting list and 
then letting AWT work on its own. A third conservative assumption concerns 
the proportion a of those rare patients who choose to maximize their medical 
outcome regardless of other factors such as waiting time. Suppose, for example, 
rare patients occur with a frequency of 30% in the population. Suppose, fur-
thermore, that 50% of these rare patients are selective and accept only an organ 
of the rare type. In this case, the selective rare patients can fairly demand 15% 
of all organs of the rare type. Figure 2 shows that the selective group of rare 
patients does indeed receive almost exactly this amount of rare organs. This 
figure plots the difference between the actual and the minimal rate of alloca-
tion of rare organs to common patients. This difference falls quickly to zero. 
Hence, patients of the rare type will not accumulate on the waiting list since 
they receive in the long run exactly their share of rare organs. Figure 3 plots 
the same distance for a disadvantage patient type that occurs with a frequency 
of 50% in the population. Finally, we note that our calculations indulge in one 
simplifying assumption. They assume that patients do not rejoin the waiting 
list for a second transplant. In reality, Eurotransplant reported 18% of second 
time transplantations among cadaveric transplants for 1999. This simplifying 
assumption allows us to derive an analytic description of our problem while we 
would otherwise have to resort to Simulations. 
2.3 Asymmetrie Medical Types 
Disadvantages can also arise from asymmetries in the capability of a medical 
type to donate and to receive organs. Some medical types can donate organs to 
patients of other types without affecting graft survival rates, while recipients of 
this type maximize their graft survival rates only when they receive an organ 
from a donor of same type. Organs of blood type 0 can be allocated patients of 
any blood type but patients of type 0 can only receive organs of type 0. Both 
the Eurotransplant and the UNOS rule make special provisions for patients of 
blood type 0. The same statistical argument as above establishes that AWT 
automatically protects patients of blood type 0 and that no additional protection 
mechanisms are required. In 1999, Eurotransplant reported that the proportion 
of patients of blood type 0 was 39% among patients newly added to the waiting 
list and 48% among all patients on the waiting list while 44% of all donors were 
of this type. In the same year, UNOS reports for the USA that 53% of all 
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II number of transplants I 3 year survival rate I 
male to female 1771 74% 
male to male 3109 76% 
female to female 765 74% 
female to male 1244 70% 
Table 1: The effect of sex on graft survival (Busson/Benoit 1997}. 
patients on the waiting list were of blood type 0 while 40% of all donors had 
this blood type. Using a frequency of 50% for organs and patients of blood type 
0, the uppermost curve labelled 'alpha = 1' in Figure 3 shows the probability 
of misallocating an organ of blood type 0 to a patient of a different blood type. 
After only a comparatively small number of 800 allocations, the probability of 
misallocating drops below 1%. 
It has been argued that additional non-i.q!.munological factors influence graft 
survival rates. The conclusions of Busson/Benoit (1997} would imply that the 
current allocation process disadvantages men. According to this study, men 
maximize their graft survival rates when they receive an organ from a male 
donor, while the inßuence of the donor's sex is much less pronounced for female 
recipients (cf. Table 1}. The authors find that a sex mismatch erodes graft 
survival rates at 3 years for male recipients by about 6%. Persijn/Smits/De 
Meester (1999} also report an effect in this direction but their finding is less pro-
nounced. Meier-Kriesche et al. (2001} find no such effect but they seem not to 
differentiate between patients receiving an organ of a different sex. Doubtlessly, 
more studies are needed to resolve these questions. We can nonetheless note that 
matehing for these non-immunological criteria opens a Pandora's box of moral 
dilemmas under the current allocation methods. We study the example of men 
matehing for sex. A WT again offers a clear improvement over the status quo for 
the disadvantaged sex and reduces any imbalances that could have been avoided. 
In 1999, women occurred in the European cadaveric kidney donor population 
roughly with a frequency of 43%. For the sake of brevity, we approximate this 
situation by consulting Figure 3 for a frequency of 50%. A misallocation would 
occur if we allocated a male organ to a female patient while there was a shortage 
of male organs among male patients with the same waiting time as the female 
patient. The figure shows that the probability of such a misallocation quickly 
falls to zero. This is true even if only some proportion a of all men decide to be 
selective and match the donor organ for sex. 
2.4 Medical Optimality 
AWT resolves the moral dilemma of reconciling the maximization of an indi-
vidual's well-being with a societal notion of distributive justice. As more non-
immunological and morally sensitive factors emerge as predictors of graft survival 
rates, the moral properties of AWT have implications for the medical optimality 
of our proposal. A WT allows criteria like sex, age, race or any other additional 
criteria to be taken into account without violating moral fairness norms. This 
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procedure therefore produces outcomes that are as close to the medical optimum 
as current medical knowledge allows and as close as the patients desire. If AWT 
falls short of the medical optimum, it does so in response to how the patients 
value the importance of graft survival rates vis-a-vis waiting time. There are 
no objective grounds for criticizing the patients' choice. 
Patients have a definite incentive to maximize their graft survival rates, espe-
cially in view of medical side-effects and complications arising from poor medical 
compatibility. Moreover, their choice will be guided by medical experts and we 
will retain some control over the range of the choice that can be offered to the 
patients on medical grounds. Patients in an overall poor medical condition may, 
for instance, be suspended from the waiting list until their condition improves. 
This suggests that the medical performance of AWT may not be far from the 
medical optimum. It may in principle even perform better than the current al-
location mechanisms that do not take non-immunological criteria into account. 
If the current allocation rules were in the future to include non-immunological 
criteria, they would become entangled in moral dilemmas concerning the max-
imization of individuals' expected medical outcome and norms of distributive 
justice. Wujciak/Opelz (1993) reach an opposing conclusion in their discussion 
of a similar 'first in, first out' allocation method. The poor performance of this 
method in Wujciak and Opelz's simulation depends on the fact that an organ is 
allocated to the first patient on the waiting list without considering the patient 's 
own choice. In particular, the patient is not given a choice between accepting or 
declining the allocated kidney on the basis of her preferences for waiting time, 
HLA matching, PRA sensitization etc. Their simulation therefore assumes that 
organs are randomly accepted and rejected by patients regardless of their prefer-
ences. This is an unrealistic assumption since patients have a very clear incentive 
to choose organs promising a high survival rate. 
AWT could widen the acceptability of age-specific matehingthat is, for exam-
ple, intended by Eurotransplant's 'old-for-old' programme. Suchprogrammes 
become superßuous because waiting time creates an incentive for older people to 
consider accepting an organ from an older patient without a great loss in their 
graft survival rate. AWT also allows an increased use of marginal organs based 
on circumspect local decision. The patients' informed consent avoids severe legal 
problems of adequate disclosure of medical risks (for the USA, cf. Canterbury v 
Spence, Ref. 464F dd 772, 1972, USCA District of Columbia; for Great Britain, 
cf. Bolam, 2 All ER118, 1957). 
2.5 Interpersonal Comparisons 
The properties of allocation methods have been studied extensively by a large 
body ofliterature in social choice theory (Mongin/d'Aspremont 1998). We here 
present a positive conclusion from this Iiterature supporting our proposal. The 
current Eurotransplant and UNOS allocation rules are special cases of a general 
dass of rules whose properlies are very well understood.5 The most crucial in-
sight of the last 30 years of theoretical research on allocation rules concerns the 
5 Rules maximizing the sum of some point scheme are known as utilitarian rules. 
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critical importance of trade-offs between the well-being of different individuals. 
Such trade-offs require not only intra-personal comparisons of a single individ-
ual's well-being under different allocations, but also inter-personal comparisons 
of different individuals' well-being under different allocations. The following 
statements provides an example of such comparisons. 
Intra-personal comparison: Patient 1 is better oft' with 1 HLA-mismatch and 6 
years of waiting than with 3 HLA-mismatches and 3 years of waiting. 
Inter-personal comparison: 1 HLA-mismatch and 6 years of waiting for patient 
1 is better than 3 HLA-mismatches and 3 years of waiting for patient 2. 
The allocation rules used by Eurotransplant and UNOS make both intra- and 
inter-personal comparisons that are implicit in the scheme through which pa-
tients are awarded points. The point scheme implicitly determines by how much 
patient 1's well-being with 1 HLA-mismatch and 6 years of waiting outweighs 
patient 2's well-being with 3 HLA-mismatches and 3 years of waiting. These 
interpersonal comparisons may not be intentional. At least in the published liter-
ature, these point schemes are judged by equity criteria pertaining to the overall 
allocation of organs and not to trade-offs among individuals. Wujciak/Opelz 
1993, for example, point out that their XCOMB point scheme yields overall 
survival ratesthat are close to the optimum (using only HLA matehing as a 
predictor of medical outcome). Leffell/Zachary 1999 evaluate the updated 1995 
UNOS scheme by examining whether they promote racial equality and related 
criteria. De Meester et al. (1999) explicitly evaluate the Eurotransplant rule on 
the basis of weighing the societal aims of medical efficiency and equity. The con-
siderations of the preceding sections show that A WT agrees with those implicit 
interpersonal comparisons that derive from the morefundamental motivation 
to protect rare or otherwise disadvantaged patient types. After only a few or-
gan allocations, the probability becomes small that an organ is misallocated to 
a patient of an advantaged type to the detriment of a disadvantaged patient. 
Even if unintended, more widespread interpersonal comparisons are implicit in 
the Eurotransplant and UNOS allocation rules and directly affect the patient's 
eligibility and opportunity. 
There is no moral basis for making these comparisons. It is both practically 
impossible and morally inappropriate to make intra- and inter-personal compar-
isons of well-being on behalf of the patients. Firstly, these comparisons would 
require a quantitative evaluation of the effect of additional waiting time. A par-
ticular quantification often turns out to be the artifact of a particular elicitation 
method (cf. the difference between the studies in this volume). Secondly, only 
patients have access to highly relevant information about their own situation, 
such as the physical, psychological and emotional suffering that additional wait-
ing time inflicts on themselves and their families at a given point in time. Thirdly, 
even medical experts disagree on how HLA matches and waiting time should be 
weighted. No satisfactory method hasever been proposed for settling such dis-
agreements about the relative weight of medical and non-medical criteria. For 
the purpose of policy recommendations, all three of these problems severely limit 
Brought to you by | California Institute of Technology
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/8/17 12:05 AM
184 Matthias Hild 
the usefulness of studies that elicit medical expert's subjective trade-offs. Apart 
from doubts about the feasibility of making interpersonal comparisons system-
atically and coherently, it is also morally inappropriate for society to make such 
decisions on behalf of a patient. This is especially true if non-medical consider-
ations about the patient's particular psychological, social or emotional situation 
are permitted. Compromising expected graft survival time in favour of a shorter 
waiting period or other non-medical aspects is a deeply personal choice that 
should not be taken away z,from the patient. As so many personal choices, it 
is also an extremely complex and difficult choice for which the patient must be 
offered any possible support. 
This realization is the first step of a positive and constructive argument. 
Luce/Raiffa (1957) pointout that an inability to make inter-personal compar-
isons commits us to a particular class of allocation rules. A WT falls within this 
distinguished class of allocation rules. In other words, there are strong addi-
tional reasons in favour of AWT over and above the optimality properties that 
we have established above. 
Theorem. lf we cannot make any interpersonal camparisans and i/ we want 
Pareta optimality, then we must define some priority ranking among individuals 
and then let the inditliduals determine the allocation in the order of their se-
niority. That is, we must choose an alloca#on that maa:imizes the welfare of the 
individual with the highest priority, then that of the individual with the second 
highest priority etc. 
Fora detailed proof, cf. Gevers (1979). Although this theorem does not tell 
us how to prioritize patients, it tells us that AWT is ofthe correct type. We will 
now discuss what factors other than waiting time should determine priority. 
2.6 Special Considerations 
We now turn to group of patients that seem to merit special consideration by an 
allocation mechanism. While for most patients the allocation of a donor kidney 
is mainly an issue for their mid-term quality of life, some patients are threatened 
by severe impairments of their future health and their future ability to enjoy a 
good quality of life if they do not quickly receive a transplant. Children, for 
instance, seem to deserve special consideration in the allocation process because 
their physical development during adolescence is severely impaired without a 
transplant. For patients of high medical urgency, a delayed offer of a transplant 
can even result in death, while the overall mortality rate of patients on the 
waiting Iist is comparatively low. Children and patients of high medical urgency 
therefore simply do not have the time to wait for their entitlement under AWT 
or any other allocation rule. It seems to be agreed that such patients must be 
moved forward on the waiting list. By assigning bonus waiting times to such 
patients, we can determine whether they should be moved to the very front of 
the waiting line or to some region close to the front. 
By analogaus means, we can adjust for regional and international import-
export imbalances. This is a problem of particular political importance for Eu-
rotransplant where different nationalities contribute to and receive organs from 
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a shared pool of donor organs, thus increasing the probability of iinding good 
HLA matches. AWT treats patients of different origin equally and any imbal-
ances of imports and export are the result of these patients' free choices. There 
may however exist some disadvantages for which certain regions or nationalities 
deserve compensation. Since, for instance, cold ischemia time is an important 
predictor of graft survival rates, patients from countries on the periphery of the 
common allocation area are at a disadvantage. Caused by morally irrelevant 
topographical facts, they have to accept on average somewhat Ionger transport 
times and Ionger cold ischemia times. In order to ofl'set such efl'ects, we can 
again award a bonus waiting time to patients from the periphery and thus move 
them ahead on the waiting Iist. 
More generally, there is a very simple algorithm for equalizing imbalances in 
attributes that for moral reasons should be irrelevant. Think of attribute A as 
a central geographical region and of attribute B as a peripheral geographical 
region in the allocation area.6 A general method of compensating for irrelevant 
attributes calculates on a regular basis the average waiting times WA and WB 
of patients of type A and type B. H WB exceeds W A, we award patients of type 
B the difl'erence WB - W A as their bonus waiting time. This method assumes 
that the distribution of time preferences is identical among patients from area A 
and area B. If patients from area B were on average less concemed about long 
waiting times and more about good HLA matches, then this imbalance would 
be the result of a free choice of the B patients. The question of which attributes 
deserve compensation needs to be studied in more detail. 
In the past, there has been a persistent shortage of donor organs and an 
excess of patients in need of a graft. The European data for 1999 show that the 
net inflow into the waiting list exceeded the net outflow by 198 patients even 
if we hypothetically exclude additional demand through retransplantations.7 If 
this trend continues, average waiting time will increase by 0. 78 months per year, 
or about 4 months in 5 years. Under these conditions, future patients are disad-
vantaged relative to current patients (leaving aside potential but yet unforeseen 
advances in medical technology). We might consider awarding patients who join 
the waiting list at a later time a bonus waiting time of 0. 78 months per year 
to o:ffset the birth-time disadvantage of future patients. This might be feit to 
restore injustices arising from the morally arbitrary hour of a person's birth but, 
of course, cannot combat the dearth of donor kidney. 
The same reasoning could be applied to the distribution of kidneys among 
small and large transplantation centres. We could by the same method award 
a bonus to patients from small transplantation centres if the strengthening of 
6 The attributes A and B must be such that the patients' choices do not depend directly 
on A and B. If, for example, all Austrian patients (attribute A) bad a preference for Belgian 
kidneys, then Austrian patients would clearly have to wait much Ionger than any other patient 
group ( attribute B). This increased waiting time is, however, the result of a free choice of the 
Austrian patients. 
7 If we allow patients to rejoin the waiting Iist after they have lost their first transplant, the 
inßow rate into the waiting Iist increases even more and further disadvantages future patients. 
This poses additional questions about how re-transplant patients should be treated in the 
allocation process. 
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small transplantation centres is politically desired. The moral relevance of some 
other attributes is much barder to evaluate. Should the patient, e.g. a diabetic 
smoker, be held responsible for his past behaviour leading to kidney failure? 
Such attributes play currently no role. 
2. 7 Practicability 
The decision to accept or to reject a donor organ for transplantation poses a com-
plex problem that requires a difficult final decision by the patient. Tragically, 
most important decisions in life are of this nature. The patients in medical care 
will benefit from the counsel of their medical advisers and the decision-making 
process must be structured so as to minimize the psychological discomfort or 
anxiety experienced by the patient. To relieve the stress of an instantaneous 
decision and to expedite the allocation process, the patients are asked to draft, 
together with their medical advisers, a plan for when to accept an organ of what 
type. The patient has the option to delegate the decision to the transplant sur-
geon or to rely on the recommendations of a panel of medical experts such as the 
commission that produces the European Best Practice Guide on Renal Trans-
plantation. Patients with impaired mental abilities or with mental disorders are 
represented by their guardians or are treated under a default plan devised by an 
expert panel. The patients' choices can evolve and consolidate over time since 
they have the opportunity to revise their stated preferences on a regular basis. A 
project is currently under way to develop a cognitively and emotionally tractable 
format in which patients can absorb medical information about their situation. 
3. Conclusion 
We summarize the properlies of our proposal. Our proposal resolves concerns 
about distributive justice: 
• Disadvantaged patient types are automatically protected. 
• Morally sensitive attributes such as sex, age and race can be used as se-
lection criteria without creating injustices. 
• Age-specific programmes, such as Europe's old-for-old programme, be-
come superfluous. Waiting time creates an incentive for older people to 
consider accepting an organ from an older patient without a great loss in 
their graft survival rate. 
Patients and their medical advisers locally cletermine tracle-offs between im-
munological and non-immunological criteria and between medical and non-
medical criteria: 
• The patients' informed consent allows an increased use of marginal donor 
organs and protects transplant centres from liability claims. 
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• Involving patients in decision making has positive psychological effects 
and may be conjectured to increase post-operative compliance with the 
medication regime. 
• Prioritization by waiting time is an extremely transparent and easy to 
understand criterion. Point schemes, on the other hand, impose a regime 
of abstract calculations that patients, physicians and politicians might find 
more difficult to accept. 
Our allocation method adapts flexibly to new medical developments: 
• The allocation mechanism remains impartial in the controversy about the 
relative importance of HLA mismatching and cold ischemia times. 
• No revisions of the mechanism are needed when new medical factors emerge 
or when of new medical technology is created. 
A crucial prerequisite of AWT is the development of a support system for pa-
tients and their surgeons. Central authorities such as UNOS or Eurotransplant 
will continue to play a crucial role by formulating best practice guidelines, by 
monitoring the information and the support that is provided to the patients and 
by maintaining the allocation process. 
Appendix: Statistical Analysis 
Any allocation algorithm has to operate in a stochastic environment in which 
organs and patients of different types become available in a random order and at 
random times. We wish to find the probability that a patient of a 'disadvantaged' 
type is passed over in favour of a patient of an 'advantaged' type. We derive 
this probability under the worst-case assumptions that advantaged patients can 
accept any organ and disadvantaged patients can only accept organs of their own 
type. We are at this point not interested in how patients discriminate between 
subtypes of organs. It is then enough that we distinguish two medical types 
(1, 2} of patients and organs. For patients of type 2, we also distinguish between 
two sub-types 2a, 2b. We adopt the following worst-case rules that will govern 
the dynamics of the waiting list: 
1. Patients of type 1 and type 2b accept organs of type 1 and type 2. 
2. Patients of type 2a accept only organs of type 2. 
The probability that an organ of type 1 becomes available is 1 - q and the 
probability that an organ of type 2 becomes available is q. The probability that 
a patient of type 1 is added to the waiting list is 1 - p, the probability that a 
patient of type 2a is added to the waiting list is o:p and the probability that 
a patient of type 2b is added to the waiting list is (1- o:)p. We assume that 
drop-out rates from the waiting list have already been subtracted from the rates 
with which patients join the waiting list. We assume that these probabilities 
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are independent of each other. In other words, the event of an organ becoming 
available does not affect the probability of a patient with a certain type joining 
the waiting list. We also assume that these probabilities remain constant over 
time and that patients do not rejoin the waiting list for a second transplant. 
We assume that the waiting list is long enough so that there is always demand 
for an organ. In the future this situation may perhaps change, but it is the 
reality of today. Thanks to this simplifying assumption, we are able to treat 
the problem with analytical means. We model the waiting list by a sequence 
x1 , x2 , ••• , Xn. ••• where Xn = 1, 2a, 2b and where x1 is the type of the patient 
who has been waiting the langest. Before any organs have been allocated, the 
probability that Xn = 1, 2a, 2b is 1 - p, ap and (1 - a)p, respectively. The 
composition of the waiting list changes with time depending on the allocation 
rule and depending on the organs that become available. 
In an optimal allocation for the selective type 2a, any patient ofthistype receives 
an organ of type 2 so that a proportion of q - ap type 2 organs that remains 
for the patients of all other types. If this remaining portion of type 2 organs is 
allocated randomly among the patients of type 1 and type 2b, then the smallest 
possible probability of allocating a type 2 organ to a patient of type 1 is 
Pmin 
Pmin 
= (q- ap) . 1 - P ' 
1-ap 
= 0, else. 
when ap=i 1. (1) 
We derive the probability Pn that an organ of type 2 is allocated to a patient 
of type 1. Such an allocation occurs when an organ of type 2 arrives while a 
patient of type 1 is at the first position of the waiting list after the n - 1st arrival 
of an organ. Recall that patients of type 1 and type 2b accept any organ. Hence, 
if we consider a patient of one of these types at position k, we know that no 
patient with a rank l ~ k has so far received an organ. A patient at rank l after 
n organ arrivals must therefore have held rank l + n before any organs arrived. 
Hence, the probability of the patient at ranl!: l being of type i after n organ 
arrivals is identical to the probability that, before any organs have arrived, the 
patient at rank l + n is of type i. H we know that the initial part of the sequence 
of patients after n organ arrivals is {fl, 1) or {fl, 2b), then the probability of the 
sequence continuing as ii is only determined by the nurober m 1 of patients of 
type 1 in fj, the number m2 of patients of type 2a in fi and the nurober m3 of 
patients of type 2b in fi. For i = 1, 2b, 
Pn({fl,i,yjl{fl, i)) = (1- p)mt (ap)m2 (p- ap)ma 
When ap =I 1, we also have 
1-p Pn({fl,l)l{fl, 1) or {fl,2b)) = -1 -
-ap 
(2) 
(3) 
For any n E N and k E N+, we write Qn(k) for the probability that the first 
patient of type 1 or type 2b occurs at position k after the nth arrival of an organ. 
For any k E N+ , we have 
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Qo(k) = (ap)Jc-1 (1- ap) (4) 
Suppose we already know Qn(k) (for any k E N). We now derive Qn+l (k) (for 
any k E N). In a (n + 1)-sequence of organs, the last organ is of type 1 (Case 1) 
with probability 1- q and of type 2 (Case 2) with probability q. We consider 
all l E N-1- sub-cases in which the first patient of type 1 or type 2b occurs at 
position l. The probability Qn(l) of each such sub-case is independent of the 
type of the n + 1st organ and thus independent of Case 1 and Case 2. Oase 1: 
The n + 1st organ is of type 1. Such an organ is rejected by patients of type 
2a and accepted by patients of type 1 and type 2b. Conditional on l ~ k, the 
probability that, after n + 1 organ arrivals, the first patient of type 1 or type 2b 
occurs at rank k is (by (2)) the probability of l being followed by k - l patients 
of type 2a and 1 patient of type 1 or type 2b, i.e., (ap)k-l (1 - ap). Conditional 
on l > k, this probability is zero. Oase 2: The n + 1st organ is of type 2. Such 
an organ is accepted by any patient. Conditional on l = 1, the probability that, 
after n + 1 organ arrivals, the first patient of type 1 or type 2b occurs at rank 
k is (by (2)) the probability of the first patient being followed by k - 1 patients 
of type 2a and 1 patient of type 1 or type 2b, i.e., (ap)k-1 (1- ap). Conditional 
on l = k + 1, the probability that, after n + 1 organ arrivals, the first patient of 
type 1 or type 2b occurs at rank k is trivially one. Conditional on 2 ~ l ~ k or 
k + 2 ~ l, this probability is zero. We thus obtain 
Qn+l (k) = (1- q) ( L Qn(l) · (ap)lc-1(1- ap)) (5) 
19~1c 
+ q ( Qn(1) ~ (ap)lc-1 (1- ap) + Qn(k + 1)) 
Moreover, we can now derive the probability that a patient of type 1 is at the 
front ofthe waiting Iist after n E N organ arrivals. When ap = 1, this probability 
is zero and Qn(1) · /-=-!,. otherwise (by (3)). We finally arrive at the probability 
Pn that the nth organ (n E N-1-) is misallocated. 
1-p 
Pn = Qn-1(1)·q-1--, 
-ap 
Pn 0, eise. 
when ap I- 1. (6) 
Next, we obtain the expected proportion oflosses of organs oftype 2 after n E N-I-
organ arrivals: 
en = 
en = 
En 
-, q·n 
0, 
when q "1- 0. 
eise. 
(7) 
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